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The size and sophistication of the British and French nuclear 
modernization programs raise serious questions about their role in western 
strategy and about their contribution to European security and political 
stability Incorporating the conditions set by London and Pans for their 
participation m  superpower nuclear negotiations could have four useful 
outcomes, achievable in sequential but overlapping order a more stable 
superpower balance, a more reliable western nuclear deterrent, a gradual 
shift from dependence on nuclear to conventional deterrence by both blocs 
accompanied by cuts in conventional forces, and, as the nuclear and 
nonnuclear environments are stabilized, an East-West conflict oriented 
increasingly toward socioeconomic and political competition Whether 
Franco-British nuclear forces will be a positive force will significantly 
depend, as the analysis below argues, on an enlargement of the process, 
scope, and aims of U S arms control policy
Problems Posed by British and French Nuclear Forces 
France and Britain have the capability to destabilize superpower 
control when it may be most needed in a crisis, to prompt or to escalate 
conflict, to elicit, however unwittingly, preemptive strikes against 
British, French, and NATO forces, and to increase the chances of accidental 
inadvertent or unintentional nuclear war Even where deliberation and 
calculation are present, both European nuclear powers may impose their 
preferred strategies, based on smaller military capabilities and a 
significantly narrower geographical base of operations, on the superpowers, 
potentially hastening a superpower nuclear exchange and resulting in
1
widespread material damage and civilian loss of life
The expansion and modernization of Franco-Bntish also significantly 
complicates superpower arms control talks Neither power participates m  
strategic arms reduction negotiations, and there is no formula on the 
negotiating table at Geneva to integrate their arsenals into the superpower 
balance The Soviet confronts three western nuclear forces (and a fourth 
with China) No Soviet planner can be indifferent to them
The United States also faces tough choices at two distinct levels If 
a theatre nuclear weapons accord is reached, it may have to choose between 
alliance cohesion and Soviet demands for compensation or control over 
western nuclear systems, an issue already posed m  negotiations over 72 
Pershing IA missiles owned by West Germany but armed with U S nuclear 
missiles And even if arms control progress is halted, the U S still has 
an interest in influencing the military strategies, deterrent moves, and 
targeting priorities governing British and French nuclear forces as well as 
their composition, readiness, and deployment 
Capabilities
By the end of the 1990s, British and French nuclear forces, already 
impressive, will be formidable Each will have invulnerable, second-strike 
forces capable of placing the Soviet Union at risk Each can already 
inflict damage on the Soviet Union outweighing any conceivable gain that 
might tempt a Soviet attack on their homelands The British Trident will 
comprise four submarines, each with sixteen D-5 missiles The D-5, with a 
range of over 4,000 miles, is to be bought from the United States It will 
very likely be mounted by a U S -designed bus which will deliver up to 
eight independently targeted warheads to be produced by Great Britain 1
3U S buses are of two types The Mk5 will carry eight W88 475 kt war­
heads, the Mk4, currently used in Trident I, can deliver 12-14 W76 100 kt 
warheads  ^ As a unilateral arms control measure, aimed partially at 
blunting the criticisms of domestic opponents, the Thatcher government says 
it will restrict planning to eight warheads, the maximum number of warheads 
earned by the C-4 Downplayed is the greater accuracy and throw weight 
capacity of the D-5 3 Britain s Trident could have as many as 512 warheads 
of approximately a half-megaton apiece
For economic and strategic reasons, the Thatcher government may 
confine Trident to three full complements of missiles and warheads, i e , 
about to 48 missiles (plus spares) and 384 warheads These numbers are 
based on planning that foresees one submarine always on deep patrol, 
another preparing or m  transit to relieve it a third under service in 
port but potentially capable of firing m  an emergency, and a fourth 
essentially out of commission and undergoing major refit and overhaul 4 
If only one Trident submarine were available (two more likely m  an 
emergency), Britain would still have awesome striking power to visit intol­
erable devastation on the Soviet Union With four to five warheads aimed 
at each of the Soviet Union s 22 cities with a population of one million or 
mori, all potentially within the range of the D-5, a single Trident 
submarine would conceivably threaten 40-45 million Soviets with the prompt 
effects of a nuclear explosion —  and even more when radiation and wide­
spread social dislocation m  the wake of a nuclear attack are factored m  
French nuclear forces of the 1990s will be equally lethal They will 
be built around six nuclear submarines Each will carry sixteen French- 
built M-4 missiles, each MIRVed with six 150 kt warheads Five of France s
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six nuclear submarines are undergoing refitting to replace their sixteen M- 
20 missiles, each with a one-megaton warhead, with the M-4 system The 
sixth submarine will be replaced m  the 1990s by a submarine of more 
advanced design The M-4 will likely be replaced by an improved, more 
reliable M-5 missile The French have three submarines always on station 
If they build a full complement of missiles and warheads for their 
submarine forces, in contrast to likely British practice, they would have 
96 missiles (plus spares) and at least 576 warheads In addition, 18 
IRBMs, with a single megaton warhead, are stationed m  southern France 
Rounding out French strategic nuclear forces are 18 aging Mirage IV 
bombers, with in-flight refueling capacity, which will be retained into the 
1990s These aircraft will be modernized with medium-range air-to-surface 
stand-off missiles (ASMPs) armed with a 100-300 kt warhead 5 The first set 
of six of these modernized Mirage IVPs were deployed m  May 1986 6 Between 
them, France and Britain may have approximately 1,000 strategic warheads at 
their disposal Their submarine forces will comprise about 20 percent of 
the West s sea-based deterrent 7 
Strategy
Britain and France have pursued divergent strategies, aimed as much to 
influence U S nuclear practice as that of the Soviet Union While both 
have adopted in principle a policy of minimum deterrence each has followed 
a contrasting approach in its efforts to influence behavior of the 
superpowers the British preferring officially to coordinate their forces 
and planning with those of the United States and NATO, the French, to 
distance themselves from Washington and to withdraw from NATO military 
cooperation within the Atlantic Alliance to maximize their independence
5and, by that token, their leverage over U S and Soviet moves
As a consequence of an agreement signed at a meeting in the Bahamas 
between Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and President Kennedy, British 
Polaris forces have been since December 1962 assigned as a part of a NATO 
nuclear force and targeted in accordance with NATO plans ® This same 
understanding was carried forward under the agreement with the Carter and 
Reagan administrations to supply Trident II missiles, equipment and 
supporting services on a continuing basis and in a manner generally similar 
to that in which Polaris was supplied 9 if this understanding is read m  
isolation, it would appear that British nuclear forces are an integral part 
of NATO defenses, since the NATO commander is an American, British nuclear 
striking power would also seem to be under U S presidential control 
Reinforcing this impression is the participation of British officers in 
target planning in developing the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) 
of the United States Less assuring is the caveat, inserted by Macmillan 
in the Bahamas communique and repeated thereafter by succeeding British 
governments, that British forces might not be available where Her Majes­
ty s Government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake 10 
Since 1962, the accent has shifted toward the independence of British 
nuclear forces in U S and in British announced policies Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara s reservations were overruled at the Bahamas 
meeting In a speech m  the spring of 1962, presumably with White House 
approval, he attacked independent European nuclear systems as dangerous, 
expensive, prone to obsolescence and lacking m  credibility as a 
deterrent 11 Macmillan turned Kennedy around, relying principally on his 
rapport with the president while manipulating the president s sense of
6personal and political obligation to replace the canceled Skybolt air-to- 
surface missile, which had been expected to extend the life of Britain s 
increasingly vulnerable V-Bomber force ^  With the demise of the U S - 
backed multilateral nuclear force in the mid-1960s, substantially under­
mined by British countermoves,^ the British deterrent was freed of what 
remaining allJttnce coil might have constrained it In 1974, NATO 
ministers, meeting in Ottawa, affirmed the purported contribution of 
independent European nuclear systems to western deterrence 14
Bntish leaders, while acknowledging repeatedly Britain s contribution 
to NATO, underline the independence of British nuclear forces They are 
said to add a second centre of decision-making to reinforce deterrence 
against possible Soviet aggression George Younger, Secretary of State for 
Defence, explained how it would work We have no doubt that [the American 
nuclear] commitment remains as firm as ever But m  certain circumstances, 
the Soviet leadership might misjudge American resolve and miscalculate the 
consequences of aggression against western Europe In such circumstances, 
British nuclear weapons would greatly complicate the calculations of Soviet 
leaders They could not attack Europe without risking a strategic nuclear 
response 15 Left unstated was the implication that Britain might have to 
act independently, either alone (if indeed the U S was not forthcoming) or 
to prompt a supportive U S initiative
Emphasizing Britain s independent deterrent has made good domestic 
politics for the Thatcher government and, ironically, reinforced its 
standing in Washington Labor apparently lost votes among some of its 
traditional supporters as well as some undecided voters for its insistence 
on Britain s unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons ^  The Reagan
7administration also viewed a Labor victory with concern lest Britain s 
denuclearization encourage neutralist sentiment m  NATO Another major 
factor underlying the Trident accord was the fear, adroitly turned to 
advantage by the Thatcher government, that failure to renew the special 
nuclear relationship would lead to a cut m  British forces committed to 
NATO, a concern signaled by both Presidents Carter and Reagan m  agreeing 
to U S help 17
Labor s nuclear position negated much of the credibility that the 
Reagan administration might have attached to its election proposal to 
reallocate funds from Trident to bolster British conventional forces, 
especially in Germany In a curious reversal of mutual alliance expecta­
tions, Thatcher s Conservative party earned favor by insisting on Trident 
even at the cost of spending on nonnuclear arms while Labor lost 
Washington s confidence by pledging a larger British contribution to NATO s 
conventional readiness —  what thje Americans were on record as wanting —  
but at the expense of an indépendant nuclear deterrent Critics also 
doubted that Labor, once m  office, would be able to deliver on its promise 
to strengthen Britain s conventional forces in the face of constituent 
pressures to increase welfare spending Labor s campaign promise to 
negotiate the end of U S storage of nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom 
during the five-year lifetime of a parliament, if it should win election, 
reinforced U S skepticism
As a quid pro quo for Trident, the Thatcher government will let U S 
nuclear-armed forces stay, but British forces can be expected to remain 
under tight national direction, while formally assigned to NATO Whether 
they will be available when they are most needed as a deterrent or whether
8
they will be subject to U S control in a confrontation with Moscow remains 
problematic Meanwhile, the costs of the Trident system, in excess of 10 
billion pounds, are hampering fulfillment of Britain s promise to upgrade 
its conventional forces ^  Spending on the British Army on the Rhine has 
already stagnated Despite rising costs, expenditures have remained con­
stant since 1985,^9 and the Thatcher government has announced a seven 
percent decrease m  defense spending over three years
U S influence over French nuclear forces appears even more tenuous 
There is no special relationship between Washington and Pans to restrain 
France, French domestic opinion, unlike Britain s, heavily favors an inde­
pendent nuclear force narrowing the potential impact of external pressures 
on public sentiment, and French nuclear capabilities are almost entirely 
indigenous Until the NATO Ottawa declaration, U S -French nuclear rela­
tions were as marked by controversy as those between Pans and Moscow 20 
French doctrine is unambiguous about total national control nuclear forces 
m  the hands of the French president 21 French strategy is defined in 
terms of deterrence, and not of defense or of deterrence by denial 22 
NATO s flexible response strategy has never been adopted by French leaders 
Conventional and tactical nuclear forces are primarily assigned roles 
subordinate to French strategic forces They are to be independently used 
to test adversary intentions If a full-scale Warsaw pact attack is under 
way, these forces may well be used m  cooperation with NATO forces to repel 
a Soviet or eastern bloc assault, but there exists no agreed upon plan —  
nor is one envisaged —  to coordinate French and NATO forces The French 
president will use these forces at times and places of his choosing 
The NATO commander has no way of knowing when and if French
9conventional forces or facilities will be available the contingencies 
under which French tactical nuclear forces might be used to test an 
attacker s determination, or the circumstances under which a strategic 
strike might be launched From a Soviet perspective, it will be all but 
impossible to discriminate between a NATO or a French nuclear strike Once 
hostilities begin, operational plans linking French and NATO forces are not 
in place to control the scope and extent of damage or to bring the conflict 
to a halt Creating these uncertainties is precisely a major aim of French
thinking, designed to influence both allied (specifically U S )  and 
adversary behavior m  ways deemed favorable by the French president
The rigid separation of French and NATO forces dictated by de Gaulle 
and institutionalized m  France s withdrawal from the NATO organization has 
gradually eroded as successive French presidents and governments have had 
to adjust to new strategic problems occasioned by the geographic 
constraints of the European battlefield, the modernization of superpower 
offensive and defensive systems as well as shifts in their balance, and the 
evolution of arms control negotiations 23 Since the middle 1970s, French 
planners have accepted the notion of a single European battlefield, 
rejecting earlier, artificial distinctions between a battle for western 
Europe and for the national sanctuary The Socialist government created a 
Rapid Action Force in the 1980s composed of helicopter gunships and quickly 
deployable forces to reinforce France s approximately 50,000 troops 
stationed in Germany The RAF implements the single battle idea by 
providing the French president with an option to engage French forces early 
in the battle for Europe or to deploy them in forward positions in a crisis 
to underscore French resolve Paris has also been one of the staunchest
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supporters of U S INF deployments to ensure a common allied stance against 
the Soviet Union and to anchor West Germany to the western Alliance
France s nuclear modernization program also partly responds to allied 
concerns The Hades, a ground-based tactical nuclear system (with a range 
of 350 km), will replace Pluton whose short-range (125 km ) made it more a 
threat to West Germany than to eastern bloc forces The recently announced 
U S -French agreement to consult on conventional arms talks m  Europe is 
consistent with the trend toward allied collaboration Even under the de 
Gaulle regime, France promoted joint weapons programs and entered into more 
bilateral arrangements than any other European state 24 Since the 1970s it 
has also been increasingly responsive to U S nonproliferation concerns, 
resisting Iraqi, Pakistani, and South Korean requests for expanded nuclear 
cooperation At U S urging it sent troops to Lebanon If it refused 
overflight rights to U S F—111s based m  Britain against the Khaddafi 
regime in 1986, it did coordinate its substantial efforts m  Chad with 
those of the United States to assist the defeat of more heavily armed 
Libyan forces by those of Hissene Habré All these moves, however, still 
do not add up to an integrated French-NATO approach to nuclear deterrence 
Targeting
British and French targeting plans emphasize penetration of Soviet 
defenses to deliver unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union Until 
recently, British planners have been attached to the so-called Moscow 
criterion British planners have long felt that the test of a credible 
British deterrent was its ability to threaten Moscow since it is the seat 
of the Soviet government and purportedly of such high value m  Soviet eyes 
that it is the site of the only antimissile system permitted by the ABM
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treaty The British modernized the warhead system carried by their Polaris
fleet with the Chevaline in the 1970s to overwhelm Moscow s Golash
antimissile system 25 The Chevaline is a multiple, but not a MIRVed or
independently targeted, re-entry vehicle Warheads impact on a defined
target m  close proximity of each other, leaving a larger footprint than
the earlier one-megaton warhead of the Polaris A3 The capacity of the
Chevaline bus, while secret, is reportedly composed of up to three 200-
kiloton warheads with decoys and penetration aids
The Trident II system of D-5 missiles and MIRVed warheads has expanded
the British notion of what are the material requirements of minimum
deterrence, while creating new options for Britain s target menu In
justifying the decision to buy Trident I in 1980 (later upgraded m  1982 by
the purchase of the more capable D-5 or Trident II missile), the Thatcher
government went well beyond the Moscow criterion m  characterizing its
targeting approach to the Soviet Union
The Government does not believe that our deterrent arm would be 
adequately met by a capability which offered only a low likelihood of 
striking home to key targets, or which posed the prospect of only a 
very small number of strikes, or which Soviet leaders could expect to 
ward off successfully from large areas of key important to them 
The Government thinks it right now to make clear that their concept 
of deterrence is concerned essentially with posing a potential threat 
to key aspects of Soviet state power 2^
It is difficult to reconcile NATO s flexible response strategy under 
U S presidential control through the NATO commander with Britain s target­
ing plans to threaten key aspects of Soviet power To be credible the 
British deterrent would have to be able to act independently to convince 
Soviet planners to desist from some proscribed behavior adverse to British 
interests Soviet leaders had to be convinced, as a British White Paper 
observed, that Britain would launch an attack if they [the Soviets]
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thought at some critical point as a conflict developed the US would hold 
back 27 But British nuclear forces would also have to be able to act if 
the U S did hold back As targets expand to the warheads available, the 
wider targeting menu available to British planners may tempt earlier use of 
nuclear weapons than the Moscow criterion as targeters seek to define 
intermediary steps between an ineffective conventional response and all-out 
nuclear war in the face of a Warsaw Pact attack
French strategy and targeting are less tentative than their British 
counterparts about the need for autonomous control of national nuclear 
forces and targeting plans in the face of whatever pressures or provoca­
tions might be initiated by either or both superpowers 28 Since de 
Gaulle s rejection of the Kennedy administration s proposal for a NATO 
multilateral nuclear force, initially a part of the Polaris offer to 
Britain, the French have successfully resisted any U S attempt to exercise 
influence over the size, composition, or employment of their nuclear for­
ces French strategy also seeks to minimize the risk of being drawn into a 
nuclear war against its wishes through too close French association with 
the U S The principles of independent use of nuclear weapons, nonautoma- 
ticity, and nonbelligerency underscore, moreover, French determination to 
be as free as possible m  addressing the Soviet Union in an idiom of deter­
rence or detente to suit its interests as circumstances dictate
In one sense, French targeting plans appear to have evolved m  a 
similar way to Britain s As capabilities have grown, so also have 
France s targeting menu and its notion of what is required for minimum 
deterrence The French have adopted an enlarged anticity posture, 
apparently including m  their target list important economic, administra-
1
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tive, and political sites as well as cities and industrial centers This 
expanded list of targets suggests more a French objective of increasing the 
scope and probability of damage to the Soviet Union than the adoption of a 
war-fighting strategy For France and Britain, the latter course is beyond 
their resources and geopolitically ruled out given the disparities between 
them and the Soviet Union
In striking what some French writers call the vital works of an 
adversary —— oeuvres v i v e s , more human and material destruction may be 
wrought than concentrating solely on Soviet cities since the devastation 
would be greater in scope and more lasting A recent MIT computer 
simulation of alternative targeting plans suggests that attacking the 
energy-producing infrastructure of the Soviet Union would have a greater 
retarding effect on long-term recovery efforts than targeting associated 
simply with destroying population centers 50
In contrast to Britain, however, France is significantly enlarging its 
nonstrategic nuclear forces as integral parts of its preplanned deterrent 
moves These nuclear elements, comprising separately armed air, sea, and 
ground units, have been designated prestrategic forces Again, there are 
no plans, in contrast to British Tornado aircraft or ships, armed, respec­
tively, with British-made free-falling bombs and depth charges, to coordi­
nate the employment of France s prestrategic forces with NATO responses 
These nuclear forces are ostensibly designed to test Soviet-bloc aims in an 
attack and to signal French escalatory intentions by inflicting significant 
military damage on enemy forces Speaking of the nuclear message to be 
carried by Hades (or presumably other French prestrategic forces), French 
Armed Forces Chief of Staff Jeannou Lacaze insisted that it have military
Heffect, which is to say that it must be effective and brutal, which means a 
relatively massive employment and therefore limited m  time and space But 
above all this warning must be integrated in the general deterrent 
maneuver 51
Anglo-French Conditions to Arms Control Participation
Neither London nor Paris is keen on participating m  superpower 
nuclear arms limitation talks Both successfully weathered Soviet 
pressures to be counted in negotiations over long-range ballistic systems 
m  Europe Both contended that their national systems were strategic, not 
theatre, neither, moreover, was ultimately subject to NATO or U S control 
Moscow acceded to this position m  proposing its breakthroughs on long- and 
medium-range missiles within NATO s arsenal The Soviet Union appears less 
flexible on national strategic systems It has already served notice 
through Chief of Staff Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev that British and French 
forces would have to enter the global armaments process at some point m  
the wake of a European missile accord 52
Britain and France have set stiff conditions to their consideration of 
being drawn into superpower offensive and defensive strategic arms 
limitation talks First, there would have to be substantial decreases m  
U S and Soviet offensive striking power Neither European nuclear power 
defines what substantial is Even a reduction of 50 percent to 6,000 
warheads, as have been proposed by superpower negotiators, might not meet 
Anglo-French demands Fifty percent cuts would still leave superpower 
warhead totals at a level over 10 times greater than either European 
nuclear power While Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has not ruled out 
British participation, the chances of inducing her government into talks
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would appear to be slight if left entirely to a bean-counting exercise 
If between the two powers, the numbers went down massively and enormously 
and we moved into an entirely different world then there may be circum­
stances when ours [British nuclear forces] will have to be counted 53 Not 
only the nuclear beans in the jar will have to diminish but the jar itself
_ an entirely different world —  will presumably have to be safe and
shock-resistant before London will submit its forces to negotiation 
Former French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, reflecting a widely shared 
French opinion across a broad spectrum of party positions, made a similar 
point m  setting as a precondition to French inclusion in superpower 
negotiations the reductions of the superpower arsenals to levels where one 
might consider that the gap between capabilities had changed in nature 54
Second, both European powers insist on no fundamental changes m  
superpower development of defensive nuclear systems, including ABM, ASW, 
and passive measures The British Chevaline was designed to penetrate 
Soviet ABM defenses, the D-5 is in turn a hedge against a breakdown of the 
ABM treaty regime and possible new deployments by the Soviets 55 The 
French also feel that they have most to lose by progress in superpower 
antimissile development In a presentation to the National Assembly, 
former Defense Minister Charles Hernu argued that superpower competition in 
developing defense systems against nuclear attack would prompt an arms 
race, dismantle the space and ABM treaties, sanctuanze the home lands of 
the two superpowers at the expense of U S alliance commitments and 
extended deterrence, and accentuate the conventional imbalance in Europe m  
the eastern bloc s favor 56
Third, France has explicitly entered a third condition, viz , signifi­
37cant reductions in Warsaw Pact conventional arms and chemical weapons 
Britain s reaction to Soviet proposals to cut missiles in Europe also 
evidences a sensitivity to perceived eastern bloc superiority m  nonnuclear 
armaments While opinion differs whether London has explicitly defined 
this as a condition, it has on more than one occasioned underlined the 
importance of maintaining a credible NATO and British deterrent to offset 
Soviet and East European conventional forces 38 a superpower strategic 
arms agreement that was not linked in principle to conventional reductions 
by Soviet bloc forces would receive a cool reception in both European 
capitals, not to mention Bonn which is directly under pressure from Warsaw 
Pact forces
The United States is in a particularly delicate position If it leans 
on its allies to cut their arsenals, it splits the alliance and weakens the 
credibility of its nuclear guaranty to Europe If it ignores the problems 
posed by independent nuclear forces and allows the European systems to be 
primarily defined by the national economic and technological resources 
devoted to them, it blocks progress on arms control with the Soviet Union 
If the United States compensates the Soviet Union too generously for 
British and French nuclear forces over which it has little or no direct 
control, it may create the worst of all worlds heightening allied 
perception of U S willingness to lower its commitment to European defense, 
increasing pressures on Britain and France to expand their nuclear forces 
at the expense of conventional capabilities, and isolating Germany even 
more as its principal allies adopt increasingly unilateralist positions 
The neutralist drift in German domestic policy would be strengthened as 
would the sentiment that German security interests depended more on
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accommodating Soviet wishes rather than tending to crumbling western 
defenses
Turning a Problem into an Opportunity Breaking the Impasse
The responsibility for breaking the impasse over British and French 
participation m  strategic arms talks lies more with Washington than with 
Moscow —  or even with the European states Neither Britain nor France can 
be expected to limit its nuclear modernization programs or to accept 
restraints on their operational use unless they are assured about the 
reliability of the nuclear deterrent regime for Europe, including the U S 
guaranty, on terms responsive to their differing strategic needs and 
acceptable to the differentiated constraints posed by their domestic poli­
tics and public opinion To prepare the path to participation, the United 
States can take a number of steps that would relax British and French 
reservations First it will have to listen before it will be heard
Both Britain and France want a superpower negotiated security regime 
for Europe that strengthens deterrence against the Soviet Union but 
promotes peaceful political and economic exchange and engagement The 
contradictory stances assumed by U S on nuclear policy over the past 
decade have repeatedly challenged British and French preference for a 
policy of deterrence cum detente On the one hand, U S abandonment of 
the SALT process, the gradual erosion of SALT II limits, and aggressive 
implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s signaled 
what appeared to be a unilateralist bent in U S nuclear strategy and a 
disconcerting U S commitment to a warfighting strategy driven by the aim 
of nuclear superiority While London and Pans initially welcomed an
*
expansion and modernization of the American nuclear arsenal as well as INF 
deployments to match Soviet strategic and theatre forces, as much a 
symbolic political gesture as a response to strategic requirements, both 
supported observance of SALT I and II limits and continued superpower 
negotiations on arms reductions Neither wanted an unregulated arms race 
which would threaten their own nuclear forces heighten East-West tensions 
and arrest detente in Europe, or increase pressures on already tight 
national defense budgets, galvanizing domestic opponents against increased 
defense expenditures (particularly troublesome in Britain), upsetting the 
French security consensus which rests on a narrow resource base, and 
straining alliance cohesion over burden sharing and over priorities to be 
assigned nuclear and nonnuclear forces
On the other hand, the Reykjavik summit, where President Reagan 
proposed eliminating all ballistic missiles m  ten years, and Washington s 
quick and what many m  Europe viewed as expedient embrace of Premier 
Gorbachev s double-zero option for long- and medium-range missiles raised 
fears in London and Pans that the U S might weaken its nuclear commitment 
to Europe and give impetus to its denuclearization for the sake of an arms 
accord with the Soviet Union British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher s 
November 1986 visit to Washington, m  the wake of the Reykjavik summit, was 
hastily undertaken precisely to limit the damage of the President s propo­
sals Thatcher elicited the President s pledge —  so-called Camp David II 
—  to discipline U S arms control to the needs of European deterrence and 
to restrict the U S negotiating position at Geneva to 50 percent cuts m  
superpower warhead inventories 59 Damage to the prestige of the Reagan 
administration over Iran-contra disclosures has simply lent urgency to
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European fears about U S resolve as well as its capacity to lead, hence 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher s hasty trip in July 1987 to lend support 
to the Reagan administration beleaguered by the controversy with Congress 
Superpower conflict or condominium, reflecting wild swings m  U S 
policy pronouncements andt behavior, have become real, if alternating,
' Ipossibilities The three conditions defined by Britain and France for 
their participation in strategic arms talks are essentially hedges against 
either unsought contingency Only if the U S incorporates these condi­
tions into its negotiating position toward the Soviet Union, while contain­
ing the temptation to act unilaterally, can they be induced to pay lower 
premiums on their nuclear insurance policies to protect their interests and 
to cooperate in building a more stable European security regime
Negotiating a Stabler Nuclear Environment
First, the U S should negotiate a nuclear environment with the Soviet 
Union unambiguously dedicated to stable deterrence, not superiority SDI 
is a touchstone of U S intentions It remains the major source of concern 
for NATO allies and the Soviet Union According to British Foreign 
Secretary Geoffrey Howe, who summarized the European critique over two 
years ago, SDI fosters a mutually supportive offensive-defensive arms race, 
undermines the strategic arms control process by eroding the ABM treaty, 
damages deterrence by decoupling U S and European security interests, and 
it does all this for no purpose since ABM defenses can be easily over­
whelmed by readily available countermeasures 4° Howe s criticism, as sharp 
and probing as any emanating from Moscow, came m  the wake of Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher s failure to g a m  President Reagan s adherence
20
in practice to the Anglo-American understanding of December 1984 The 
communique emerging from Camp David I, recognized more in the breach by the 
Reagan administration than in the observance, pledged both parties to four 
aims
The U S and western aim is not to achieve superiority but to 
maintain balance, taking into account Soviet developments,
SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have 
to be a matter of negotiations,
The over-all aim is to enhance, not undercut, deterrence, and
East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security with 
reduced levels of offensive systems on both sideá 41
Two years later, British concerns about the American SDI program had not
been stilled In an address to the International Institute for Strategic
Studies, Howe again referred to his 1985 reservations about SDI, adding
that we have to accept that not everything technically possible may be
(■
affordable or prudent 42 Adapting SDI to a stable deterrent regime would 
address allied misgivings and foster progress m  superpower strategic 
talks
London and Pans have pursued contrasting routes to dimmish the 
adverse impact of SDI on their nuclear forces and, specifically, on the 
multilateral deterrence regime on which their security interests depends 
Following traditional practice, the British have tried to limit SDI by 
influencing U S policy from within They were the first to sign a 
memorandum of understanding with the Pentagon to help British firms m  
competing for SDI contracts Prime Minister Thatcher has also personally 
tried to find a compromise between the U S and Soviet position by intro­
ducing the notion of feasibility in component testing 43 A wider range 
of research and development would be permitted under Thatcher s formula
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than under the Soviet position, hut one narrower than the Reagan adminis­
tration s preferred interpretation that would essentially reject all treaty 
restraints on research, testing, and development France, where opposition 
to SDI unites political parties, has been more direct in its attack on SDI 
It has also launched an alternative to SDI m  the Eureka program under 
European Community auspices to encourage European civilian high-tech 
cooperation While it permits national firms to compete for SDI contracts 
(why not eavesdrop on the U S SDI program while winning lucrative con­
tracts) the government has not signed a formal agreement with the Pentagon 
to guide and facilitate bilateral cooperation 44
SDI and its Soviet counterpart, even more than the multiplication of 
superpower offensive capabilities, threaten British and French nuclear 
forces Neither has the resources to keep pace m  an offensive-defensive 
superpower nuclear arms race Both prefer to restrain Soviet (and 
American) anti-ABM efforts by preserving as much of the ABM treaty as 
possible, using SDI as a bargaining chip to induce Soviet compromises on 
deep cuts m  offensive forces and on defensive systems Such an approach 
would also reconcile U S support of the British Trident program and the 
Ottawa declaration There is a fundamental contradiction in proclaiming 
the value of independent nuclear deterrent forces m  NATO, at no small cost 
to the states involved, while working to undermine their effectiveness
To create incentives for British-French participation in superpower 
talks, SDI need only be brought into line with its limits growing budge­
tary restraints occasioned by mounting U S deficits, declining congres­
sional support, Soviet-allied objections and, not least of all, preponder­
ant scientific opinion about the modest prospects for SDI 45 a step for-
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ward would be to stand still and adopt a restrictive interpretation of the 
ABM treaty while focusing negotiations with the Soviet Union on verifica­
tion procedures to preclude cheating or breakout Not only would the arms 
talks be advanced, but U S policy would be harmonized with the broad aims 
of the December 1984 Thatcher-Reagan communique A principal (but by no 
means the only) stumbling block to a superpower accord on strategic weapons 
will have been eliminated The United States will then have returned 
unequivocally to the principle of a negotiated not unilaterally imposed, 
nuclear environment in which British and French forces can be reasonably 
expected to contribute in stabilizing, not disrupting, its European 
component
A More Reliable and Stable Western Nuclear Deterrent 
Second, the U S should use its leverage to elicit British and French 
cooperation m  constructing a more reliable and stable western deterrent as 
an integral part of the evolving superpower regime The U S , as the 
strongest member of the western alliance and still Europe s guarantor, is 
the strategic bridge between the four nuclear systems (it built one, sus­
tains another, and has at different times sold equipment and know-how to 
bolster a third ) It is in the most favorable position to lead m  negoti­
ating a multilateral deterrent regime for Europe that responds not only to 
its own needs and interests but to the competing requirements of its allies 
and principal adversary 
Possible Areas of Atlantic Cooperation
There are several ways to give impetus and direction to an expanded 
western and Soviet-Amencan arms control process As a start, the Anglo- 
American special relationship should be gradually extended to France The
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pace of this process would necessarily have to be pragmatically calibrated 
to the technical and military opportunities for expansion arising from 
mutually perceived strategic needs ( e g ,  exchange of intelligence or 
technology) and to the relaxation of domestic constraints on cooperation 
(strong in France but not negligible m  the U S and Britain)
At a minimum, the French may well be disposed to U S proposals to re­
duce accidental, unintended, unauthorized, or preemptive use of French and 
British nuclear forces while reinforcing their invulnerability and penetra­
bility France s submarine force has several problems Its submarines 
reportedly run louder, slower, travel closer to the surface and have less 
range, station time, and durability than the U S or British Trident The 
reliability and efficiency of their C3I systems also need to be improved 
Improvements in these categories could be achieved through Anglo-American 
technology transfers Such exchanges would be especially appealing m  the 
construction of the seventh and future submarines that will undoubtedly be 
authorized to replace France s aging fleet Data about acoustical and 
nonacoustical ASW research and developments, and even joint work m  these 
fields, would keep the French force abreast of latest western developments 
and, through intelligence transfers, of Soviet progress Other possible 
areas for greater cooperation, where France is dependent on its allies,4^ 
are early warning of attack and target acquisition and evaluations
Penetration and assured destruction are functions of timely warning, 
responsive C3I systems under tight political control, and accurate target­
ing and guidance data and systems On all these scores France needs 
assistance The recent high priority assigned to the development of a 
reconnaissance satellite m  the French defense budget in the next five-year
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plan underscores French concerns about the blind spots in the force de 
frappe * s space support system The military satellite systems available to 
the superpowers, as one knowledgeable observer concludes, "can only be 
realized on a European scale 47 Budgetary restrictions have also slowed 
French purchase of AWACS to provide warning and controlled responses, 
coordinated with those of its allies, to hostile air attacks There is 
some evidence that the French have instituted their own permissive action 
links (PAL) to ensure positive political control over its nuclear 
weapons Whether they are adequate or not would be an obvious topic for
Franco— and Anglo-American exchanges A western hotline would also improve 
procedures for crisis management The nine joint working groups covering 
U S and British collaboration and data exchange on Trident could be 
enlarged on an ad hoc basis to draw French and Anglo-American planning into 
closer alignment over time without fundamentally constraining independent 
national use 4^
In return for U S assistance, the British and French contribution to 
European nuclear stability might assume several forms Increased communi­
cation among the western powers, tighter operational and political control 
of nuclear weapons, and discussions on targeting and crisis management 
procedures could strengthen western arms control practices and protocols 
Caps would also be placed on British and French nuclear modernization as a 
quid pro quo for superpower offensive and defensive nuclear limitations 
Franco-British concessions might well be ^ used as a bargaining lever to 
induce deep superpower cuts
Limits might apply to the number of submarines, missiles, warheads, 
and throw weight —  or to some combination of these elements to achieve
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reductions For example, the British and French might be held to four and 
five submarines, respectively The British might be restricted to 30 
missiles plus spares to arm three of its four submarines with 10 missiles 
Each loaded submarine would carry 80 (10 X 8) warheads Four of France s 
five submarines would be loaded with 10 missiles, but each boat would have 
60 warheads (10 X 6) Both countries would then have 240 warheads m  their 
inventories The British and French would be expected to have, respective­
ly, at least two and three submarines on station in a crisis or 160 and 180 
warheads at their disposal The higher operational totals for the French 
would be offset by the higher expected throw weight and warhead accuracy of 
the British Trident system Such a combined force on station or each alone 
would still be able to inflict intolerable damage on the Soviet Union 
Franco-British Incentives to Cooperate
It is difficult to detail how the two European systems might be 
composed since their configurations would be the product of inter-allied 
and superpower bargaining The more important point is the need for the 
creation of western tripartite negotiations A smaller Trident force, 
framed by corresponding deep superpowers cuts in offensive forces, would 
potentially have appeal for the Thatcher government ensuring Britain s 
requirements for an independent nuclear deterrent for this century, 
promoting a broader domestic consensus, based on a smaller Trident, to 
sustain the program over its lifetime, and enlisting London s active 
participation in defining Europe s security regime for the next decade 
France poses a more difficult obstacle The mutual suspicions and 
failed expectations characterizing French and Anglo-American security 
relations throughout most of this century will not be easily overcome
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Despite a flawed historical record and still strongly lingering Gaullist 
strictures, a new generation of French leaders might be induced to have 
France assume full occupancy of its arms control chair as a response to a 
new strategic environment First, U S flirtations with strategies to 
abandon deterrence either by seeking a compelling nuclear superiority or by 
erecting impenetrable defenses against nuclear attack evidence a chronic 
tendency in U S policy that appears to be gaming ground within the U S 
security community across political or partisan lines From a European 
perspective this inclination can be explained as an attempt to escape the 
dangers and frustrations of the superpower balance of terror, but is no 
less ominous for being reasonable if viewed through American security 
lenses
American withdrawal symptoms from nuclear deterrence have appeared m  
earlier transformations as the Kennedy administration s brief adoption of a 
counterforce strategy in the early 1960s Symptoms also appear m  the 
Defense Secretary James Schlesinger s search for strategic options under 
the Nixon administration and m  the Carter regime s redefinition of U S 
targeting in PD-59 Similarly, U S arms control strategies —  the Partial 
Test Ban in the 1960s and the nonproliferation treaty (both aimed partially 
at France), and the Carter administration’s management of SALT II and the 
cancellation of the neutron bomb (a blow to the Schmidt government m  Ger­
many) —  manifest a U S proclivity to override European security inter­
ests 50 These temptations are endemic to the U S -European security rela­
tion Containing these withdrawal tendencies, whether manifested in U S 
behavior by expanding offensive and defensive nuclear systems to superpower 
destabilizing levels or by reducing their presence and commitment to
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Europe, appear now to have reached an unprecedented level of concern for 
the European allies What in the past appeared to be differences m  degree 
between the United States and Europe now appears to be a divergence m  the 
very criteria applied by both to meet their security needs
Second, but on other grounds than those just cited, there is weakening 
elite and public support m  the United States, m  Europe, and, specifical­
ly, in Germany for current levels of U S nuclear and nonnuclear forces m  
Europe 51 Reasons differ on both sides of the Atlantic, but they converge 
to erode the foundations for U S forces and bases m  Europe In the 
United States they arise from budgetary constraints and from rising insis­
tence on greater European burden-sharing, in Europe they are reflected m  
fears of U S risk taking ( e g  , in the attack on Libya) and from diverse 
efforts to accommodate Soviet preferences
Third, and of particularly critical importance for France, is West 
Germany's ambiguity, facing uneasily toward the East for detente and toward 
the West for security based on a strategy of nuclear deterrence which it­
self is increasingly disputed within Germany 52 Undermined is the Gaullist 
expectation of Bonn's solid attachment to the western security system De 
Gaulle could have assumed U S protection for continental Europe, even 
while disparaging its credibility, as long as the Washington-Bonn connec­
tion held West Germany was both the vehicle through which the U S stra­
tegic guaranty to continental Europe passed and the glacis behind which the 
French nuclear deterrent would maneuver U S protection could be enlisted 
without the compensating burden of sharing risks and costs on the same 
basis as France's European allies which remained m  NATO 53
Growing neutralist, pacifist, and anti-American sentiment m  West Ger-
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many make it increasingly susceptible to Soviet threats and blandishments 
In contrast to London and Pans, Bonn’s Ostpolitik, whether governed by the 
Right or Left, is formulated in terms of the detente cum deterrence It 
has most to lose if the hard-won g a m s  of detente are nullified and its de­
velopment arrested Its unrequited aspirations —  increased and easier ex­
changes with East Germany and eastern Europe, relaxed tensions with Moscow, 
and, over time, the gradual effacing if not the elimination of Germany's 
division —  are more in Moscow's power to give than the West's to grant
Fourth, the dynamism and flexibility of current Soviet arms diplomacy 
under the Gorbachev regime, alert to exploitable splits in alliance cohe­
sion and in the domestic consensus of western states on security, might 
well succeed where military threats previously failed to denuclearize 
Europe or to decrease the opportunities of western resort to nuclear 
weapons There was always the dim possibility but not the imminent likeli­
hood of a superpower arms accord that might progressively denuclearize 
Europe, isolating France's force de frappe and the British deterrent while 
subjecting the continental states, particularly West Germany, to eastern 
bloc pressures arising from what many m  Europe believe to be its prepon­
derant nonnuclear forces Moscow's aggressive campaign against nuclear 
weapons, publicly signaled m  a major party document in January 1986,^ and 
the success of Gorbachev’s double-zero option and diplomacy of charm no 
longer rules out Europe's gradual denuclearization without counterbalancing 
reductions m  the East's nonnuclear forces
Sixth, French economic and technological resources and the domestic 
consensus on which defense spending rests —  calculated at approximately 4 
percent of GNP — 55 are now so strained that exterior assistance is needed
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to sustain the ambitious objectives of the latest French five-year defense 
plan French means and willingness to spend more for defense fall short of 
the ambitions of French defense planners who are preparing for a follow-on 
system to the M-4» a new mobile missile, a füll-range of prestrategic 
nuclear weapons for all the armed services, a new nuclear-fueled aircraft 
carrier, and the replacement of the Mirage 2000 in 'the 1990s —  all without 
allied help Slowed economic growth, presently below 3 percent a year, 
offers little hope for France s escape from these economic and political 
limits
France needs help on all these fronts to retain what appears to be a 
receding U S nuclear commitment and military presence in Europe, to anchor 
Bonn to the West, to blunt the Soviet denuclearization campaign, to sustain 
its position in the detente sweepstakes, and to increase allied contribu­
tion to France’s arms development A policy of the empty chair, as some 
influential players m  the French security community recognize,56 no longer 
serves French interests
Partly in response to this changing strategic environment, successive 
French governments since the 1960s have, as noted earlier, drawn France 
into closer military and political alignment between national and alliance 
policies ( e g ,  changes in announced doctrine and the creation of FAR) and 
into arms control regimes ( e g ,  nuclear nonproliferation) 57 The new 
strategic environment created by recent real or perceived shifts in U S , 
German, and Soviet thinking and behavior can be expected to prompt similar, 
if painful, revisions Firm but sensitive U S leadership and tangible 
rewards for cooperation without a lien on independence over operational 
control of nuclear forces would speed and smooth the period of adjustment
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Once France is a member of western nuclear arms talks, with well-estab­
lished credentials as a superpower critic, it can be expected to spur both 
superpowers to make deep cuts in their own inventories While neither 
superpower now has much direct influence in shaping France's force de 
frappe neither does France have much impact on superpower strategic 
policies and arms control accords that vitally affect its security An 
expanded western arms control negotiating framework could ease French fears 
and reassure British planners that their concerns are addressed and their 
participation assured
Possible Areas for European Cooperation
If direct U S overtures prove initially more a challenge than an 
opportunity for France to strengthen its nuclear forces and an invitation 
to contribute directly in reconstituting Europe's security system, then 
another avenue might be to facilitate direct British—French nuclear 
discussions These have already been held Their encouragement would not 
necessarily be incompatible with expanded tripartite talks With lijttle 
difficulty, both states could coordinate the scheduling of their submarines 
on station to maximize the number of submarine patrol days Target menus,
as distinguished from coordinated targeting plans, might well be broached
i
in discussions as well as the possibility of target reporting to minimize
redundancy, an acute issue for small nuclear powers Progress on these and
associated fronts will depend on Washington's support since Great Britain
is currently obliged to adhere to a complex web of restrictions about
sharing U S technology with third parties Or, Paris and London might
cooperate on developing a cruise or an air-to-ground missile Both these projects
S ftare likely to raise less problems about British sharing of U S data
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The multiplication of Franco-Bntish nuclear talks and cooperation 
would also foster a long-term solution to the problems raised by European 
dependency on the U S guaranty It remains a historical anomaly, as Jean- 
Pierre Bechter, Secretary of the National Defense Committee of the French 
National Assembly, observed, that 320 million Europeans [whose GNP 
approximates that of the U S ] can continue forever to ask 240 Americans to 
defend us against 280 million Soviets 59 While it is in the vital inter­
est of the United States to preserve open economic and political institu­
tions m  Europe, and to be closely associated with its defense, long-term 
stability will only be possible when Europe's security rests on a strong 
European consensus Nudging Europe to initially adopt convergent if not 
congruent defense policies through closer Franco-Bntish ties makes 
especially good strategic and political sense only if they are placed in a 
multilateral framework Otherwise, they would smack of the Gaullist 
Directorate proposal of the late 1950s which would have concentrated NATO's 
leadership in a troika composed of the western nuclear powers, potentially 
at the expense, and certainly without the participation of other alliance 
members, most notably West Germany Moreover, the destabilizing features 
of three centers of nuclear initiative and the hazards of horizontal and 
vertical proliferation promoted by current western nuclear policies would 
not be attenuated over time Convergence in western nuclear policies is a 
precondition for positive movement toward a European deterrent and toward a 
dampening of global proliferation incentives
As a start, Britain and France could pledge their deterrents to 
Europe s defense London already formally assigns its nuclear forces to 
NATO and, more concretely, holds hostage its intentions by maintaining
1
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ground and air forces in Germany It has also shown renewed interest in 
regenerating the Western European Union (WEU) as a forum for articulating 
European defense concerns ^0 France, while a strong proponent of an 
expanded WEU, has refused to publicly extend its nuclear deterrent to 
Germany and to its other NATO allies It has confined itself to renouncing 
what have long been outdated notions of a national sanctuary and of 
redefining its conception of the field of battle to the Elbe and beyond 
It has also implemented, as noted earlier, ad hoc measures to enlarge the 
sphere of its cooperation with its European allies But the prospect of a 
slimmer U S presence in Europe and a German uncertainty about where its 
true security and political interests lie bring into question France s 
jealous regard for the principles of nonautomaticity and nonbelligerency 
France s splendid isolation indeed isolates Other states are thus given 
freer rein to define Europe s (and France's) security Nonautomaticity and 
nonbelligerency are two-way streets
Integrate Nonnuclear Forces into the European Nuclear Regime 
Where France has a particularly vital role to play is in linking cuts 
m  nuclear weapons to the nonnuclear balance in Europe It has been ahead 
on this issue since the superpowers began the START and, later, the Geneva 
talks on nuclear systems 61 It is now joined by Britain m  insisting on 
progress in nonnuclear limitations, including conventional arms and chemi­
cal weapons, as a condition for participation in arms control talks that 
may, with potentially welcome effect, de-emphasize nuclear weapons m  
Europe s defense 62 a negotiated security regime for Europe that raises 
the nuclear threshold and narrows the scope of nuclear weapons inevitably 
focuses attention on nonnuclear forces The arguments for and against
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conventional deterrence are well known and need not be rehearsed here The 
principal utility conventional forces is that they buy time, forestalling 
nuclear escalation Creation of FAR was a step in the right step m  the 
wrong direction since, to finance more mobile force, French troop levels 
had to be reduced by 22,000 If the costs of France's (and Britain’s) 
nuclear forces could be lowered through Anglo-American collaboration, 
savings could be reassigned to nonnuclear forces
The same logic applies to French tactical nuclear planning Each of 
the three services will have battlefield weapons, more as a concession to 
interservice rivalry than as a coherent response to strategic needs They 
are too small to be a useful warfighting force (an implausible scenario 
even for Europe), yet too large just to warn the Soviet Union —  un coup de 
semonce —  that a strategic strike is in preparation There are 4,600 
tactical nuclear warheads m  NATO's arsenal as well as nuclear capable U S 
and allied aircraft, forces large enough, without French help or hindrance, 
to negotiate an end to hostilities, whether deliberately or inadvertently 
begun, before escalation to strategic nuclear levels is set m  train
In light of the moribund talks on mutual and balanced force reductions 
(MBFR) m  Vienna, there is little immediate hope that the Warsaw Pact will 
be disposed to western calls for deep, asymmetrical calls in eastern bloc 
and Soviet troops or armored forces, where they have an edge (though, 
arguably, not so great as alarmists would have us believe) The arms 
control process in Europe need not await deep cuts since closer French- 
allied nonnuclear collaboration, including Spain's incorporation into NATO 
as a strategic reserve, would relax the need to rely on Soviet largesse 
The need for long-term economic reform in the Soviet Union, as suggested
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below, potentially provides critical western leverage to eventually elicit 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact nonnuclear cuts whether through Vienna or through 
the French-preferred Conference on European Security and Cooperation
Closer bilateral Franco-German military cooperation would be especi­
ally welcome Extension of France s nuclear protection to Germany, by no 
means popular m  France today but an increasingly attractive mechanism to 
compensate partially for the U S guaranty, would facilitate closer Paris- 
Bonn defense collaboration 64 a closer bilateral relationship would be 
more appealing to many m  both countries who have grounds to be skeptical 
of U S leadership U S protection would be bolstered by a stronger 
European component Germany would be less isolated m  Europe or m  the 
alliance A heightened European element within the western alliance might 
also blunt anti-American sentiment and strengthen the alliance by insu­
lating it from unpopular U S policies or behavior outside of Europe 
A confident West Germany, tied to the West, can in turn lend its 
resources to what should be the third aim of western strategy a gradual 
shift m  emphasis from nuclear and conventional deterrence to socioeconomic 
and political competition between East and West One key objective of 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher s visit to Washington in July 1987 was to 
encourage the U S leadership to seize on the opportunity for a fundamental 
relaxation of the East-West conflict 65 The possibility of such a bargain­
ing synergism, linking military, economic, and technological concessions by 
both sides, within a context of improved political relations and increased 
cultural exchange, has never been so present since the start of the Cold 
War Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who had extensive and far-ranging 
talks with Soviet Party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev during her March visit
*
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to Moscow, is apparently convinced that great changes are taking place in 
the world, including historic changes in the Soviet Union It is a time of 
unprecedented opportunity,“ said the British Prime Minister in her brief 
visit to the United States in July 1987, "if we are wise and skilful enough 
to grasp it 66 in adapting the interests and advice of its principal 
allies into its negotiating stance toward Moscow, the U S can conceivably 
open a new and productive era in U S -Soviet relations
Exploiting Soviet Weakness for Mutual Benefit
There is growing evidence that the pervasive need for technoeconomic 
and sociopolitical reform within the Soviet Union creates powerful incen­
tives for a relaxation of the conflict with the West and for a slowing of 
the arms race NATO countries with a GNP greater than twice the Warsaw 
Pact (three times if Japan is included) and with a military establishment 
that checkmates the East can bargain from a position of strength in negoti­
ating lowered nuclear and nonnuclear force levels and an easing of East-West 
tensions as well as in multiplying the number and enlarging the scope of 
exchanges of people, goods and services, and ideas across the ideological 
divide A rare opportunity exists for the West to exploit Soviet internal 
weaknesses for mutual advantage Attention and priorities can be progres­
sively directed away from lethal toward nonlethal forms of competition 
Time and resources can be reallocated from external concerns to make long- 
overdue repair of tattered domestic fabrics and to improve the quality of 
life in the East and West
To get the Soviet nation and economy moving again to ensure deep 
and lasting reform within the Soviet Union —  appears to require several 
major shifts m  Soviet foreign and security policy With an economy
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approximately half that of the United States, it spends about 15 percent of 
its GNP for unproductive military purposes This high level of expenditure 
slows the civilian economy and, worse, reduces the resources available for 
investment and future technoscientific and industrial development
The January 1986 party paper to eliminate nuclear weapons, however 
'i I much an effective propaganda and diplomatic instrument to advance Moscow s 
denuclearization campaign, can also be read as a domestic reform docu­
ment 61 Cutting spending first for nuclear arms makes sense, given the 
superpower stalemate An arms accord that slows the nuclear arms race, 
especially m  defensive systems where Moscow believes that the U S has an 
advantage, would relax the economic and technological burdens of the East- 
West conflict without essentially undermining U S -Soviet parity Less re­
liance on nuclear deterrence and more on conventional forces in operational 
planning also enhances the Soviet security position as it pursues costly 
internal reform of the economy and society (ethnic division, alcoholism, 
absenteeism)
Adoption of the double-zero option, while not necessarily weakening 
western defenses, would still not essentially change the threat to the 
western alliance of Soviet nuclear and nonnuclear forces This threat can 
only be diminished by deep cuts in both categories of weaponry The Soviet 
Union can be induced to contemplate such cuts, at a pace and in a form not 
of its choosing, if the West uses its technological and economic advantages 
as leverage Trade-offs between the East and West, while never easy, are 
not enhanced by keeping nuclear, nonnuclear, and technoeconomic negotia­
tions and bargaining insulated from each other A strengthened western 
defense and arms control position, as outlined above, is the precondition
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for a broad-based diplomatic offensive once western nuclear and nonnuclear 
deterrence regimes are more coherently defined and enjoy more widespread 
governmental and popular support on both sides of the Atlantic than they do 
today The western states will be a position to elicit Soviet concessions 
on nonnuclear forces as well as on a broad range of issues currently sepa­
rating East and West As a bonus the Soviet economy would be engaged with­
in a western dominated system A lost opportunity of the Marshall Plan, to 
keep the east open to a western dominated global economy and susceptible to 
its western influence, might now be reclaimed forty years later
Why should the Soviet Union go along and why should the West be forth­
coming9 Besides cuts in military spending, the Soviet Union needs access 
to western products and know-how Widening trade, increasing western 
credits and investment, and multiplying technological transfers imply a 
relaxation of the East-West arms race and political tensions Moreover, a 
top-heavy Soviet economy, based on an administratively determined price 
system, is demonstrably incapable of setting priorities or investing 
efficiently Since internal centralization and bureaucratization limit the 
degree to which competition can be domestically generated to reduce distor­
tions, the cold bath of external competition is needed to make Soviet 
industries and managers more efficient Changes recently instituted by the 
Gorbachev regime to permit greater flexibility and freedom from bureau­
cratic control of its external commercial agencies as well as an expansion 
of joint ventures with capitalist firms abroad signal the needs for foreign 
help and for the stimulus of competition to enhance the managerial effi­
ciency and the quality of products issuing from Soviet industry
A competition based on conflicting Soviet and western expectations on
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who will be the final winner of increased socioeconomic and political com­
petition should hardly be frightening Such competition plays to the 
West's strong suit Drawing the Soviet Union into an increasingly interde­
pendent world, already proclaimed m  official party pronouncements as a new 
strategic reality,68 poses serious dilemmas for the maintenance of the 
Soviet state in its present form and for control of its European empire 
Opting for an opening to the West is an open admission of the fading 
attraction of the Soviet model for other countries, particularly the 
developing world Moscow places itself m  competition with its clients for 
western favor Decentralization of economic planning and resource 
allocation will inevitably weaken internal party and bureaucratic control 
as new centers of power and authority are created In accommodating itself 
to a nonsocialist world economy, the Soviet Union risks diluting its revo­
lutionary fervor and commitments and losing its socialist soul The West 
did not create these contradictions Its interest is m  drawing profit 
from them through peaceful but competitive engagement framed by a negoti­
ated security arrangement acceptable to the superpowers and to their 
European allies
Conclusions
The last step along the arduous path toward integrating British and 
French forces into the superpowers balance must first be clear before the 
first step makes sense to the European nuclear powers Current superpower 
negotiations are too narrowly conceived to be attractive to London or 
P a n s  Superpower accord or conflict appears equally threatening 
Conversely, if the reservations of the West European nuclear powers are
\
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incorporated into the strategic thinking and arms control negotiations of 
the superpowers, progress can be made in slowing the arms race (deep cuts, 
constraints on defensive systems, lower British-French nuclear levels), m  
dampening the incentives for armed conflict and rapid escalation should 
hostilities erupt (improved western and East-West signaling), m  narrowing 
gaps and in eliminating costly redundancies in western nuclear and nonnu­
clear strategy and operational readiness (a more reliable and multilater- 
ally constructed western deterrent with increased emphasis on conventional 
deterrence and preparedness), in strengthening governmental, elite, and 
popular support for western defense policy (greater national responsibility 
for alliance policies within a less threatening regional security system), 
m  decreasing European dependence on the United States (gradual emergence 
of a European deterrent), and in contributing to the gradual transformation 
of West Europe's security regime In the latter instance, Soviet 
intentions can be tested by linking greater economic and technological 
exchange to decreases m  Soviet nonnuclear capabilities If the Soviet 
Union through internal reform gradually accommodates itself to a multipolar 
system, the European security which is currently directed against the 
Soviet Union can progressively be redefined to one built on socioeconomic 
and political competition with the cooperation of the Soviet Union In 
changing piece by piece the motor of a moving car, one should not expect a 
sudden change in direction but a diminished reliance on military power to 
give thrust to the East-West conflict and a gradual, almost imperceptible, 
shift m  gears from lethal to nonlethal forms of competition
A serious problem confronting U S (and Soviet) arms diplomacy and 
statecraft —  powerful independent nuclear systems in Europe —  can be
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turned to opportunity and advantage Addressing British concerns about 
neglected up-links between European nuclear forces and those of the super­
powers, prompted by an unregulated superpower arms race and given specific 
point by SDI, would relax the contradictions between U S nuclear policies 
and behavior and the independence as well as the invulnerability and pene­
trability of these forces Incorporating French (and German) insistence on 
down-links between superpower nuclear and bloc nonnuclear forces would also 
enlarge U S sensitivity to continental European worries about exposure to 
Soviet pressures if the denuclearization of the European theater does not 
move synchronously with cuts m  nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities and the 
expansion of confidence measures like those reached on East-West oversight 
of military exercises within the framework of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation m  Europe and its permutations Greater peaceful 
engagement may also feed back to lower pressures to expand the military 
requirement of European security by both sides
A superpower arms control process, supplemented by an expansion of 
western nuclear and nonnuclear arms control negotiations, would reintroduce 
Europe into the process of European security and detente The United 
States must apparently relearn how to negotiate with its allies over 
matters of vital interest to them Consultation in the form of unilateral 
pronouncements and faits accomplis have obviously not generated alliance 
confidence nor fostered coherent responses to Soviet initiatives Rifts m  
alliance thinking and planning are now routinely inspired either by super­
power conflicts —  whether in Europe ( e g ,  INF deployments) or outside 
( U S  bombing of Libya or Kuwaiti reflagging) —  or by superpower accord 
( e g  , double zero option) In much the same way that arms control between
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adversaries should be considered a long-term process of adjustment to chang­
ing internal political and external strategic needs as well as weapons mod­
ernization imperatives, alliance nuclear policy making should also be con­
ceived as an ongoing process m  which the members have differential inter­
ests, conflicting perspectives about how to respond to new strategic chal­
lenges, dissimilar and even cross-cutting internal support structures, and 
varying leverage to help or hamper an ally s aims The United States has a 
compelling interest, as the preceding discussion suggests, to influence 
British and French nuclear policies whether about capabilities, strategy, or 
targeting Inversely, so also do they with respect to the United States 
Allied cooperation cannot be commanded It can only be elicited as a func­
tion of the exchanges of benefits from alliance membership in much the same 
way that superpower arms control accords must rest on mutual interests
Progress will not be easy, quick, or cheap, much less will it be the 
result of altruistic appeals to alliance solidarity No one accord among the 
western states or between the East and West will ensure stability or peace 
The centrifugal forces moving the European states and superpowers apart are 
too compelling to be contained or constrained by any one agreement or 
statement of common purpose Independent European nuclear forces and the 
national wills which inform and direct them —  among some of the most 
powerful operating today m  the international arena —  can be harnessed to 
the service of European regional and global security and cooperation only if 
the serious concerns of millions of Europeans which underlie them are used to 
moderate the superpower conflict, the latest and potentially the most 
dangerous of a series of failed attempts over the past several centuries by 
one or more nation-states for global domination
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